Fatma Yörür
The Turkish government’s increasing use of laws to stifle dissent and control the press is facing new scrutiny as discussions resurface about a proposed “foreign influence agent” law. This controversial proposal, which was shelved twice in 2024 under pressure from civil society and opposition groups, builds on the framework established by the much-criticized "Disinformation Law."
The foreign influence proposal sought to create a new crime under the Turkish Penal Code, targeting individuals acting “against state security or political interests on the instructions of a foreign state or organization.” While the law was temporarily removed from the legislative agenda, analysts and activists warn that it remains a priority for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Concerns over press freedom and legal weaponization
Legal experts and press freedom advocates argue that these legislative moves mark a dangerous escalation in Turkey’s long-standing efforts to suppress dissent. The Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA) calls the disinformation law—officially enacted in 2022—and its potential successor the “final steps” in restricting press freedom during the AKP's 23-year rule. Critics also highlight that Turkey’s judicial system is being “weaponized” by the government to silence opposition voices.
Lawyer and journalist rights advocate Veysel Ok said, “The censorship regime operates primarily through the Criminal Judgeships of Peace, which have handed down thousands of access bans and sanctions since 2014.” According to EngelliWeb, a platform monitoring internet censorship, over 43,000 news reports and websites were blocked in Turkey from 2014 to 2023. Most of these actions were based on requests from government officials or pro-government institutions.
Historical context: From EU reforms to censorship
Turkey’s trajectory of media regulation has shifted dramatically over the last two decades. Legal expert Fikret İlkiz recalls that between 2002 and 2007, during the AKP’s early years, reforms in line with EU membership negotiations aimed to improve freedom of expression. However, this progress ended by 2013, with significant regression beginning in 2007 with the passage of the Internet Law (No. 5651).
The 2007 law, ostensibly designed to combat online crime, became a tool for silencing independent media and social platforms. Journalist Bülent Mumay noted that the 2014 amendments to this law gave the AKP sweeping powers, recalling public protests against internet censorship, such as the “Don’t Touch My Internet” marches on Istanbul's İstiklal Avenue in 2011.
“These laws were framed as measures against pornography or terrorism, but their real purpose was to control independent and social media,” Mumay said. By 2024, constitutional court rulings declared parts of the law unconstitutional, including Article 9 on access bans, yet other restrictive provisions remain in force.
Post-coup era crackdown and widespread bans
The media crackdown intensified following the failed 2016 coup attempt. Thousands of websites, social media accounts, and news reports were banned under the guise of protecting “national security.” In one notable example, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), Turkey’s media regulator, fined broadcasters over 124 million Turkish lira and imposed 1,357 broadcast suspensions between January 2023 and June 2024 alone.
RTÜK, a member of the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities, has been criticized for diverging from its European counterparts, functioning not as a licensing body but as a “censorship mechanism,” according to MLSA reports.
The government also imposed licensing requirements on foreign outlets. In 2022, Turkish courts blocked access to the Turkish-language services of Deutsche Welle and Voice of America after they declined to apply for RTÜK licenses. Their content is now only accessible in Turkey through VPN services.
Expanding censorship: The threat of “foreign influence”
The proposed “foreign influence agent” legislation raises further alarm. Critics warn that its vague wording could criminalize routine journalistic collaborations, particularly those involving international organizations. Mumay pointed out the dangers: “If you work on a cross-border investigative journalism project, such as exposing corruption, they could accuse you of acting in another country’s interest.”
Foreign journalists are especially vulnerable. A French journalist working in Turkey, who requested anonymity, told MLSA, “This law typifies the AKP government’s approach to eroding freedom of expression. If passed, it could lead to foreign press being targeted under a judiciary already politicized and leaning toward nationalist rhetoric.”
The journalist expressed concern over the government’s ability to use the law to stifle foreign media, saying, “This draft law puts the foreign press at the mercy of a judiciary aligned with the ruling coalition’s political goals.”
Looking ahead
While the “foreign influence agent” law remains in limbo, its potential introduction poses significant risks for journalists, especially those involved in investigative reporting or working with international outlets. Critics warn that if enacted, it would signal another major step toward criminalizing dissent and further isolating Turkey’s already embattled media landscape.
With thousands of journalists, academics, and activists already facing charges for defamation, disinformation, or terrorism under existing laws, the proposed legislation could deepen the climate of fear and censorship in Turkey’s press.